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The following essay was written for our Race and the Supreme Court event by
Dawinder S. Sidhu, a founding director of the Discrimination and National Security
Initiative at Harvard University. Mr. Sidhu’s work focuses on discrimination against
Muslim-Americans and those perceived to be Muslim, and he is coauthor of a book
published in 2009 titled Civil Rights in Wartime.
At earlier, regrettable moments in this nation's past, Blacks as a race were thought to
be property or inferior beings. The civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth
century offered an alternative view of race in America — the simple, undeniable truth
that all men are equal and should be judged on the basis of who they are, rather than
the race to which they belong. In challenges to racial classifications involving African
Americans, the Supreme Court made clear that the Constitution does not tolerate the
wholesale stereotyping of individuals on account of their race.
While the Court has recognized the perniciousness of race serving as a proxy for
blanket preconceptions of African Americans, in one context "“ national security "“
the Court has historically and presently considered racial proxies to be practically
sensible and legally permissible instruments. And it has done so notwithstanding
that, in times of war, Japanese , Muslim , Arab , South Asian , and Sikh Americans
have been stereotyped as a class and suffered considerable mistreatment, including
profiling, pretextual arrest, harassment, stabbing, assault, and murder. This anomaly
in the Court's evaluation of race is not only troubling by itself, but should also alarm
anyone who believes in the moral vision of the leaders we honor this month.
The Court has endorsed the use of proxies in the national security setting long before
the civil rights movement, and it continues to condone such discrimination today. In
Hirabayashi v. United States (1942), the Court upheld the conviction of an American
citizen of Japanese ancestry who had been charged with violating the exclusion
order and curfew requirements imposed after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Court
accepted the notion that the government could equate the ethnic Japanese with
those posing "a greater source of danger.” Similarly and infamously in Korematsu v.
United States (1944), the Court approved the President's executive order in which
120,000 individuals were confined to internment camps based solely on their
Japanese ancestry. Again, the Court did not find anything legally problematic with
the government casting an entire lineage as presumptively disloyal.

Justice Robert H. Jackson dissented in Korematsu, forewarning that the Court's
discriminatory reasoning "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need" "“ a cautionary,
and arguably prescient, statement. Indeed, the same sort of Court-sanctioned
proxies applied to the Japanese during World War II has been used today "“ also
with the Court's blessing "“ against Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim in the
wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), the Court reviewed allegations made by a Muslim
arrested on charges of identity theft that he was detained and segregated with other
"September 11 detainees" solely because of his race, religion, or national origin, and
not because of any tie to terrorism. The Court, crediting these allegations as true,
held that they were insufficiently indicative of any wrongdoing. "It should come as
no surprise," the Court noted, that a policy seeking "individuals because of their
suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims." This Court arrived at this determination despite the plaintiff's argument
that this "link" was predicated on his background alone.
Iqbal's logic has not been confined to the national security compartment, but has
seeped into judicial thinking on domestic law enforcement matters completely
unrelated to wartime exigencies, thereby validating Justice Jackson's concern in
Korematsu that wartime discrimination sanitized by the Court would be expanded for
"new purposes." Soon after Iqbal was decided, the Fourth Circuit in Monroe v. City
of Charlottesville (2009) held that a district court properly dismissed an AfricanAmerican plaintiff's equal protection claims stemming from a city police
department's investigation in which DNA samples were sought from random AfricanAmerican men. Citing Iqbal, the court concluded that the police department's
investigative activities were not racial in nature and merely had an "incidental"
impact on African-American men in the area: "Even though thousands of ArabMuslim men were investigated in Iqbal, the Supreme Court deemed this insufficient
to render a legitimate investigatory process unconstitutional."
These cases demonstrate the mutuality of legal interests between traditional racebased civil rights and wartime civil rights "“ specifically, the doctrinal relationship
implicating these groups as well as the reciprocal benefits in eradicating the viability
of classifications premised on race, religion, or national origin. Accordingly, those
focused on the civil rights movement may give consideration to recent cases like
Iqbal, while those working on behalf of minority groups targeted after 9/11 may look
to past strategies and successes in the racial arena for guidance. In Heart of Atlanta
v. United States (1964), for example, the Court found significant not only the acts of
excluding African Americans from motels, but also the "qualitative" and
"quantitative" experiences of African Americans in enduring such exclusion. The
experiences of African Americans encountering discrimination were also important
factors in other seminal cases from the civil rights era, including Brown v. Board of
Education (1954).
In the years since 9/11, Muslims and others have been subject to discrimination, such
as baseless ejections from airplanes, and have dealt with the attendant human
consequences, such as deciding not to travel by air or removing religious attire that

may serve as markers for adverse treatment. Drawing on Heart of Atlanta and
Brown, these real-life responses, not just the tangible acts of discrimination, should
be considered ripe for the public's attention, remedial action by policymakers, and
judicial notice. Further, in opposing the salience of racial proxies, post-9/11 activists
may point to cases such as Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), in
which the Court rejected the assumption that all members of a particular race think
alike or possess certain characteristic minority viewpoints.
This symbiotic legal relationship between race and wartime civil rights should be
reflected in how civil rights generally is framed in America today. Since 9/11, shared
experiences with discrimination and with an unsympathetic judiciary have bound
Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs in this nation with African Americans "“
whether they are aware of it or not. African Americans have progressed socially and
in the courts. But much like a family holding hands running towards a finish line,
some may be ahead of others at any one point, stumbles or differing paces will affect
the whole, and critically, victory is not achieved until all cross. Racial progress in
America therefore must be thought of and measured in collective terms. As Justice
Thurgood Marshall understood, no group will achieve racial justice solely by pulling
itself up by its own bootstraps. The communities targeted in times of war must be
included in any conversation on race. Nothing less than the true realization of the
"dream" depends on it.
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